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INTRODUCTION
Samuel Chase is not exactly unknown. Indeed, as the only U.S.
Supreme Court Justice to be impeached, he achieved a sort of instant
fame, or instant infamy. He is, I think, fairly characterized as a
"neglected Justice," however, because, in our exclusive focus on his
impeachment, we tend to forget that he did possess considerable
intelligence, virtue, legal ability, and energy that make him worth our
study. His life is also something of an object lesson in how a judge's
self-destructive tendencies can harm his reputation. As Richard
Peters, his colleague on the Pennsylvania Circuit Court remarked,
Chase had a singular instinct for tumult and appeared to have sought
controversy whenever he could. "I never sat with him without pain,"
Peters remembered, "as he was forever getting into some intemperate
and unnecessary squabble."' Chase is remembered as a rabid
Federalist partisan and a vehemently anti-Jeffersonian judge. 2
I am not aware of any other Supreme Court Justice who
apparently deprived his Court of a full complement of required
Raoul Berger Professor of Legal History, Northwestern University School of Law.
1. Letter from Richard Peters to Timothy Pickering (Jan. 24, 1804), quoted in STEPHEN B.
PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING: THE ENGLISH, THE AMERICANS AND THE DIALECTIC
OF FEDERALIST JURISPRUDENCE 11 (1991) [hereinafter PRESSER, ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING].
2. See, e.g., PETER CHARLES HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA 1635-
1805, at 288 (1984) (describing Chase as "virulently partisan, arrogant, and imposing").
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personnel because he went out on the political hustings to give
speeches in support of a presidential candidate he favored (John
Adams) 3 and against one he feared (Thomas Jefferson). 4 During the
1800 election campaign, Chase made himself an easy target for
Jeffersonian newspapers when he appeared to sympathize zealously
with the prosecution of Jeffersonian editors and writers. Indeed, more
than one historian has suggested that in the trial of one of these
writers, the notorious John Thompson Callender, Chase actively
sought to prevent "all creatures called democrats" from serving on the
jury. This assertion, however, is dubious.
5
To the victors belong the spoils of writing history, however, and
the Jeffersonians and their sympathizers have monopolized the
judgment of Chase. Even as recently as Bruce Ackerman's 2005 book
on the founding period, Chase continues to be painted as a hyper-
partisan, and my own feeble efforts to correct this view are rather
cavalierly dismissed. 6 Raoul Berger, the late prolific legal historian,
took special pains to condemn Chase, probably because of Chase's
anti-Jeffersonian views. 7 It is likely, then, that it will be a long time, if
ever, that Chase ceases to be remembered as the "American Jeffreys."
8
3. In Chase's manuscript grand jury charge book, from which manuscript Chase appears
to have taken his grand jury charges beginning in 1799, there is a reference to John Adams as
'our illustrious and patriotic beloved President, the determined foe of vice, the uniform friend of
Religion and piety, morality and Virtue .... [T]hat wise and vigilant Statesman." Samuel Chase,
Grand Jury Charge Book 21 (on file with the Maryland Historical Society).
4. PRESSER, ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 1, at 4-5.
5. For that charge leveled against Chase, see, e.g., HOFFER & HULL, supra note 2, at 241.
See generally PRESSER, ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 1, at 132-33 (suggesting that
the testimony offered at Chase's impeachment trial that he sought to pack the jury in the
Callender case was specious, given that it was hearsay evidence and the federal marshal who
picked the jury denied that any such jury-packing was proposed by Justice Chase).
6. Bruce Ackerman's book, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON,
MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY (2005), is a thoughtful, carefully
researched meditation on the nature of the world of the Framers. I think Ackerman's conclusion
that "the charges against Chase were well within the realm of constitutional plausibility," when
placed within the appropriate context is arguable, if not incorrect, but Ackerman believes that
my treatment of Chase in The Original Misunderstanding amounts to "sympathetic indulgence."
ACKERMAN, supra, at 355 n.37.
7. RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 242-51 (1973)
[hereinafter BERGER, IMPEACHMENT]; Raoul Berger, Justice Samuel Chase v. Thomas Jefferson:
A Response to Stephen Presser, 1990 BYU L. REV. 873; Raoul Berger, The Transformation of
Samuel Chase: A Rebuttal, 1992 BYU L. REV. 559. I let Raoul Berger have the last word on this
(after all, he did give me my chair), but for the nature of my disagreement with him see Stephen
B. Presser, Et Tu Raoul, or The Original Misunderstanding Misunderstood, 1991 BYU L. REV.
1475.
8. For this appellation applied to Chase, see, e.g., RICHARD ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN
CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 79 (1971) (citing Republican newspapers
characterizing Chase's actions as "those of a 'hanging judge,' an American Jeffreys"). The original
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It seems likely that Chase will continue to be regarded as a man who,
as was charged against Chief Justice Taney, "degraded his age."9 In
what follows, I will explore some of the controversial trials over which
Chase presided, some of which led to his impeachment. His conduct on
these occasions has been almost universally condemned, but I will
argue here that this universal condemnation is too glib.
I. THE TRIAL OF THOMAS COOPER
Those who accuse Chase of being anti-Jeffersonian are correct,
but there were, after all, some reasons for opposing the man from
Monticello and his champions. Take, for example, the Jeffersonian
scribblers who wrote against Adams. One was Thomas Cooper, an
English radical immigrant, who, like several others in his position,
was either financed or strongly supported by Jefferson himself.10
Chase presided over Cooper's trial for seditious libel in 1800. Cooper
had accused Adams, in print, of maintaining a permanent army and
navy, of borrowing money at too high a rate during peacetime, and of
improperly interfering in the affair of Jonathan Robbins.11 The
Constitution provides that appropriations for the Army must be
renewed at two-year intervals. 12 This theoretically makes a standing
army impossible (which was the reason for the constitutional
provision). When Cooper wrote, there was an army in the field
mopping up the recent rebellion against federal taxes in eastern
Pennsylvania. It was also true that naval vessels had recently been
commissioned and were engaged in hostilities during the undeclared
Jeffreys was George Jeffreys, 1st Baron Jeffreys of Wem, PC (1645-89), infamous for his harsh
conduct in presiding over the 1685 "bloody assizes": trials of rebels against James II.
9. For this charge against Taney, see STEPHEN B. PRESSER & JAMIL S. ZAINALDIN, LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 509 (6th ed. 2005) (quoting Sen. Charles Sumner
that "the name of Taney is to be hooted down the page of history. Judgment is beginning now;
and an emancipated country will fasten upon him the stigma which he deserves . . . . He
administered justice at least wickedly, and degraded the age." CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1012 (1865)).
10. See, e.g., DUMAS MALONE, PUBLIC LIFE OF THOMAS COOPER 1783-1839 (1926)
(describing Jefferson's strong support of Cooper, who was his lifelong friend); PRESSER, ORIGINAL
MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 1, at 131-32 (describing Jefferson's financial support of
Callender). John Adams concluded that Jefferson's "patronage of Callender and a host of
Republican libelers was not only a blot on his moral character but proof he was a captive of
party." MERRILL D. PETERSON, ADAMS AND JEFFERSON: A REVOLUTIONARY DIALOGUE 100 (1976).
11. United States v. Thomas Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 14,865). An
edited version of the case appears in PRESSER & ZAINALDIN, supra note 9, at 230.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (granting Congress the power to "raise and support
Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years").
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naval war with France, so Cooper was not totally wrong when he
wrote that Adams was maintaining an army and a navy.
Because there had been no formal congressional declaration of
war, Cooper was correct that we were borrowing money at a high rate
during peacetime. But, as Chase himself pointed out at the trial, there
was no doubt that America was engaged in hostilities with France, so,
declared or not, was at war.13 Finally, while the Jeffersonians made
much of the "Jonathan Robbins" matter-they claimed Robbins was
an American citizen wrongly put into the hands of the British by the
order of Adams-recent research has demonstrated that Robbins was
actually not an American. Rather, he was an Englishman named Nash
suspected of murder aboard an English ship, who was, pursuant to
America's treaty with Great Britain, properly turned over to British
authorities. 14 Chase's exasperation with Cooper is understandable.
Nevertheless, instead of requiring that the government prove the
falsity of Cooper's claims beyond a reasonable doubt (the standard
employed in at least some contemporary seditious libel trials), Chase
insisted that the defendant prove the truth of his accusations "to the
marrow,"15 the standard for the defense in English civil libel actions
rather than criminal ones.16 There may have been some confusion
about whether there was any difference between private and criminal
libel procedures, and perhaps Chase was not actually in error here.
With the burden he imposed on Cooper, however, it is difficult to
understand how Cooper's charges, essentially matters of opinion,
could ever be proved "to the marrow." Curiously, however, even if
Cooper's trial was an instance of Chase's anti-Jeffersonian bias, it was
never made an element of Chase's approach to impeachment.
II. THE TRIAL OF FRIES
There were two criminal trials over which Chase presided on
circuit that did become matters that the House found impeachable
offenses. The first was the trial of John Fries for treason.1 7 Fries was
one of the rebels from eastern Pennsylvania who took part in the
uprising of 1799 against a federal tax on houses. The uprising is
13. PRESSER & ZAINALDIN, supra note 9, at 232.
14. Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jonathan Robbins, 100 YALE L.J.
229, 230-38 (1990).
15. PRESSER & ZAINALDIN, supra note 9, at 235.
16. See generally PRESSER, ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 1, at 122-23
(describing the development of the different standards).
17. Case of Fries, 9 F. Cas. 826 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 5126). An edited version appears in
PRESSER & ZAINALDIN, supra note 9, at 191.
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usually called "Fries's rebellion," as Fries was the most notable of
those eventually convicted.18 The federal tax on houses was thought
necessary to meet the expenses of the military action taken to quell
the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794 in western Pennsylvania. Fries's
specific offense in the 1799 fracas was participating in the freeing of
several prisoners from federal custody, but the Federalist prosecutors
construed this as armed opposition to a federal statute, and thus
within the constitutional definition of "levying war against the United
States." This definition had been adopted earlier by the circuit courts
who tried the 1794 Whiskey rebels. Those western Pennsylvania
rebels were resisting a federal excise tax on whiskey, and, for a time,
had successfully bullied excise tax collectors into giving up their
offices. 19 Those who brought criminal proceedings against the Fries
rebels wished simply to invoke this precedent.
When Fries was first brought to trial in 1799, Justice Iredell
(probably the most anti-Federalist of the Federalist Justices), sitting
with Judge Peters, had permitted Fries's counsel, the Jeffersonian
Alexander James Dallas, and his associate William Lewis, to argue to
the jury that the Whiskey rebels precedent should be ignored as too
harsh for a republic, and that while Fries and his fellows may have
committed the common law crime of rescue, they were not guilty of the
capital crime of treason.20 This effort took nine or ten days, during
which Lewis and Dallas cited many examples of abuses of the English
constructive treason doctrine. In particular, they pointed to English
prosecutions for acts encompassing the death of the king in order to
argue that under the monarchy, an expansive treason doctrine stifled
liberties in ways that, though done at the time of the Whiskey
Rebellion, should not be tolerated in our republic. The jury in the first
Fries trial nevertheless followed the Whiskey rebels precedent and
convicted Fries. Yet Justice Iredell, convinced of the prejudice of one of
the jurors in this first Fries trial, persuaded his colleague Peters to go
18. See generally PAUL DOUGLAS NEWMAN, FRIES'S REBELLION: THE ENDURING STRUGGLE
FOR THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2004) (tracing the history of Fries's Rebellion).
19. For the Whiskey rebels' trials see, e.g., the abridged reports in PRESSER & ZAINALDIN,
supra note 9, at 175-84. For a recent popular account of the Whiskey Rebellion, see WILLIAM
HOGELAND, THE WHISKEY REBELLION: GEORGE WASHINGTON, ALEXANDER HAMILTON, AND THE
FRONTIER REBELS WHO CHALLENGED AMERICA'S NEWFOUND SOVEREIGNTY (2006) (chronicling
the events of the Whiskey Rebellion from 1791 to 1795); see also THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, THE
WHISKEY REBELLION: FRONTIER EPILOGUE TO THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1986) (discussing the
Whiskey Rebellion and its social, ideological, political and personal concerns).
20. See generally PRESSER & ZAINALDIN, supra note 9, at 184-87 (summarizing the first
Fries trial). For Justice Iredell and his interesting jurisprudence, see, e.g., WILLIS P. WHICHARD,
JUSTICE JAMES IREDELL (2000); William R. Casto, There Were Great Men Before Agamemnon, 62
VAND. L. REV. 371 (2009).
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along with him and grant Fries's motion for a new trial the next
term.
21
During that next term, Samuel Chase presided with Richard
Peters. Chase told Peters that the first Fries trial had gone on for far
too long, and that what took nine or ten days should really only have
taken two or three.22 Chase was concerned that there was a large
backlog of civil cases as a result of the Fries criminal trial, and he
believed it his duty to get those cases tried. In addition, he felt it was
wrong of Peters and Iredell to have allowed Lewis and Dallas to cite
old "reprobated" English treason cases and to use them to condemn
the American treason law laid down in the Whiskey rebels' trials.
23
During the new trial, Lewis and Dallas again relied on the theory that
just as English judges had abused the treason doctrines, so did the
judges who presided over the Whiskey rebels' trials.
Lewis, Dallas (by implication), Peters, and Iredell all appeared
to assume that it was for the jury to determine just what American
treason law was, but Chase disagreed. His position was that treason
law was settled, that the judges presiding in the Whiskey rebels' trials
had gotten it right, and so did Peters and Iredell when they charged
the jury in the first Fries trial. For Chase, then, there was no doubt
that armed opposition to a statute and armed resistance to the tax
laws constituted the capital crime of treason, and that armed rescue of
federal prisoners accused of interfering with the collection of taxes
came within the definition. In other words, the jury's task was to
accept the law formulated by the judges and not to reformulate it on
its own.
Accordingly, Chase prepared an opinion making these points
and informed Peters that he intended to deliver it before the trial so
that the prosecutors, defense counsel, and the jury would all know
precisely what the law was, and the limits of its tasks. At the start of
the trial, Peters appears to have had no problem with the idea of
delivering an opinion. He even remarked that Chase's arguments
formulated a better opinion than Peters himself had given in the first
Fries trial. 24 Still, Peters warned Chase that he needed to take care in
his manner of delivery. Peters was worried that if Lewis and Dallas
felt the law was against them, they might, as Peters put it, "take the
21. PRESSER & ZAINALDIN, supra note 9, at 187.
22. Letter from Richard Peters to Timothy Pickering (Jan. 24, 1804), quoted in PRESSER &





studs" and walk off the case. 25 Peters had apparently discerned that
Fries's counsel, hoping to make a martyr of their client and
(presumably with the aid of some negative publicity about Chase from
the Jeffersonian press) position Fries for a presidential pardon. Chase
failed to follow Peters's advice and simply distributed his opinion in a
perfunctory manner. Just as Peters had predicted, once Lewis and
Dallas read Chase's opinion and discerned that Chase was not going to
permit them to cite irrelevant English cases and was not inclined to
let them argue law to the jury, they walked off the case. They advised
their client to spurn the Court's offer to appoint other counsel for
him.26
This created a bit of a stir, and Chase retired from the
courtroom along with Peters and the federal prosecutor, William
Rawle. 27- After this somewhat unorthodox maneuver, Chase was
begrudgingly persuaded to withdraw his opinion and to allow Lewis
and Dallas to make whatever arguments they wished. Chase, wrote
Peters later, administered no "emollients [sic]," but did tell Fries's
counsel that they were free to proceed in any manner they chose,
although, he reminded them, "it would be at the hazard of [their]
reputation."28 Dallas later testified at Chase's impeachment trial that
this had the effect of confirming him in his opinion that the correct
thing to do was withdraw from the case. 29 Lewis and Dallas then left
the court and Fries was on his own, declining Chase's offer to appoint
new counsel. Chase then declared, following English practice, that he
would act as Fries's counsel and would see that Fries's rights were
protected.30
Chase's motives may have been pure, but he went so far as to
inform the second Fries jury that the first Fries jury had seen fit to
convict Fries.3 1 When the prosecutor offered to forgo summing up the
evidence because Fries had no independent counsel to do it for his
side, Chase more or less ordered the prosecutor to proceed, because
fairness to the government required it.32 Fries was convicted a second
time. The impeachment charges later brought against Chase accused
25. Id. at 190.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 190-91.
29. PRESSER, ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 1, at 111 (citing Case of Fries, 9 F.
Cas. 924, 941 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 5127)).
30. PRESSER & ZAINALDIN, supra note 9, at 191, 193.
31. Id. at 197.
32. Id. at 194.
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him of unfairly depriving Fries of counsel and of wrongly issuing an
opinion on the law before trial.
33
When one reads Fries's trial transcript today, it certainly
appears that Chase favored the prosecution, and perhaps even that he
had concluded before trial that Fries was guilty and deserved death.
Still, Chase -did make several attempts to protect Fries's rights and
offered him opportunities to give his views on the facts. 34 Indeed, there
is one account that after being pardoned by President Adams, Fries
actually journeyed to Baltimore to thank Chase for conducting such a
fair trial. 35 This has always struck me as bizarre, given that Chase
had, in no uncertain terms, made clear to Fries that he deserved to die
for wrongly imposing his will on his countrymen, and for imposing on
them the costs made necessary to crush this second tax rebellion in
five years.
36
Nevertheless, there may have been some basis for Fries to feel
that Chase had his best interests at heart. Once the guilty verdict was
rendered, Chase, the son of a Maryland minister, said to Fries, "I
presume you are a Christian," and proceeded to inform him that the
lenient government of the United States would provide him a minister
of the gospel. This government-supplied man of God, in the short time
remaining to Fries, could assist Fries in sincerely repenting for his
illegal and immoral conduct.37 Chase made it clear to Fries that
without such repentance, on the judgment day that would soon be
upon him, Fries could be expected to find himself eternally
condemned. If he did sincerely repent, however, he could still, God
being merciful, expect eternal salvation. 38 Perhaps, then, Chase's
concern for Fries's eternal soul forged a bond between the two men.
III. THE TRIAL OF CALLENDER
Shortly after Fries's trial, Chase journeyed to Richmond to
preside over the trial of James Thompson Callender, the author of The
33. See, e.g., id. at 257 (citing 1 SAMUEL H. SMITH & THOMAS LLOYD, TRIAL OF SAMUEL
CHASE, AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, IMPEACHED BY
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FOR HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS, BEFORE THE SENATE
OF THE UNITED STATES 5-8 (1805)).
34. E.g., id. at 196 ("John Fries, you are at liberty to say anything you please to the jury.").
35. 9 J. SANDERSON, BIOGRAPHY OF THE SIGNERS OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
230 (1827), quoted in PRESSER, ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 1, at 14.
36. See, e.g., PRESSER & ZAINALDIN, supra note 9, at 198-201 (reproducing Chase's
comments to Fries at sentencing).
37. Id. at 201.
38. Id. ("If you will sincerely repent and believe, God has pronounced his forgiveness; and
there is no crime too great for his mercy and pardon.").
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Prospect Before Us, a diatribe against John Adams. According to
Callender, John Adams was a "hoary headed incendiary"39 bent on
malicious destruction of anything good that remained in life and "was
a professed aristocrat; he proved faithful and serviceable to the British
interest."40 There were criticisms of many more figures in Callender's
book. In fact, there were twenty different items in the indictment
brought against him for seditious libel. Yet Callender (or his lawyers)
chose to offer a truth defense on only one of the charges: Adams, as a
professed aristocrat, had proved serviceable to the British interest. 41
The later impeachment charges against Chase that had to do
with the Callender trial resulted in the most votes for conviction.
Raoul Berger believed that Chase should have been removed from
office based on his conduct at that trial alone.42 Callender was another
paid hireling of Jefferson, 43 although one who eventually turned on
Jefferson, earning a footnote in history as the man who first
propagated the notion that Jefferson sired children by his slave Sally
Hemings. 44 Historian Richard E. Ellis labeled Callender. "perhaps the
most scurrilous newspaperman America has ever known."45 Callender
believed that Jefferson had promised him the position of Postmaster
at Richmond. When Jefferson reneged, Callender's poison pen turned
against his former benefactor. 46 But that was in the future. Back in
1800, when Chase presided over Callender's Richmond trial, the
defendant was still very much in Jefferson's camp.
Callender's lawyers, William Wirt, George Hay, and Philip
Norborne Nicholas, do not appear to have been overly solicitous with
their client's welfare. More likely, they wanted to use the Callender
trial to embarrass the dominant Federalist establishment.
47
Alternatively, but not inconsistently, Callender's counsel may have
seen the trial as a means of establishing some core principles of
39. Id. at 238.
40. Id. at 239 (quoting the indictment in Callender's case).
41. United States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239 (C.C.D. Va. 1800) (No. 14,709). An edited
version of the trial is in PRESSER & ZAINALDIN, supra note 9, at 237-47. For a highly
romanticized view of Callender, see WILLIAM SAFIRE, SCANDALMONGER: A NOVEL (2000).
42. See generally BERGER, IMPEACHMENT, supra note 7, at 234-61 (critiquing Chase's
conduct at the Callender trial).
43. PETERSON, supra note 10, at 98.
44. The Jefferson Monticello, Thomas Jefferson and Sally Hemings: A Brief Account,
http://www.monticello.org/plantationhemingscontrolhemings-jefferson-contro.htm (last visited
Mar. 6, 2009).
45. ELLIS, supra note 8, at 78.
46. PETERSON, supra note 10, at 98.
47. See, e.g., PRESSER, ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 1, at 134-35 (suggesting
that Callender's lawyers cared little for their client, but much more for the Jeffersonian cause).
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Virginia jurisprudence. As indicated above, they chose to present a
substantive defense to only one of the charges brought against
Callender. 48 The federal seditious libel statute under which Callender
had been prosecuted provided that truth was a defense, and that the
jury was to be the judge "of law and fact, as in other causes." 49 Wirt,
Hay, and Nicholas offered only one witness to prove the truth of this
charge: one Colonel Taylor, a notable Jeffersonian partisan and
constitutional theorist.
50
Chase must have understood that Colonel Taylor was there to
score political points against Adams in favor of Jefferson. Accordingly,
he required that Colonel Taylor's proposed testimony be reduced to
writing so that he could determine whether it was appropriate.
Reluctantly, Callender's counsel complied, and it appeared that
Colonel Taylor was going to testify that from his reading of Adams's
constitutional scholarship, he drew the conclusion that Adams
believed that the British constitution, which combined aristocracy,
monarchy, and democracy, was the best yet formed.51 From this,
Callender charged, one could presumably conclude that Adams was a
"professed aristocrat." Colonel Taylor was also prepared to testify,
from his own knowledge, that as president of the Senate, Adams had
cast a tie-breaking vote against a measure that would have
sequestered British property in the United States. From this, Wirt,
Hay, and Nicholas urged, one could properly conclude that Adams
"proved faithful and serviceable to the British interest."52
Still, Chase rejected Colonel Taylor's proffered testimony. This
move has been harshly criticized; Raoul Berger in particular takes it
as evidence that Chase was a prejudiced jurist who deserved to be
impeached.
As far as I know, no other scholar has defended Chase's
conduct in this regard, but I do think a defense is possible: the same
defense Chase gave at his impeachment trial before the Senate. Chase
pointed out that he would have been perfectly willing to admit Colonel
Taylor's testimony, but that the prosecutor objected to the evidence as
48. For the report that Callender's counsel chose only to defend him on this one charge, see,
e.g., PRESSER & ZAINALDIN, supra note 9, at 264 (reproducing Chase's statement at his
impeachment trial).
49. Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes § 3, 1 Stat. 596 (1798), reproduced in
PRESSER & ZAINALDIN, supra note 9, at 227.
50. See ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 206-08 (discussing Col. Taylor as a Jeffersonian
partisan).





inappropriate and prejudicial, which required Chase to rule whether it
was admissible. This also required Chase to determine what sort of
evidence would actually support the truth of the charge that "Adams
was a professed aristocrat; he proved faithful and serviceable to the
British interest."
Chase carefully examined the two phrases separated by the
semicolon and concluded that it certainly could not be libel to accuse
anyone of being a "professed aristocrat" because there was nothing
wrong with simply professing aristocracy. Similarly, it could not be
libel to accuse someone of proving "faithful and serviceable to the
British interest"; there was nothing wrong with paying homage to
another country so long as one did not betray the interests of one's
own country. To take the two phrases together, however, was surely to
imply Callender's view that Adams's professed aristocracy led him to
be an enemy to the democracy of his own country and to favor British
interests over American ones. In other words, to combine the two
phrases was to imply that Adams had a traitorous motive in casting
his vote against the sequestration act. The statement amounted to
criminal libel because it suggested that the then-Vice President was a
traitor. Being a traitor was of course criminal, and the accusation of
criminality was libel.53
Neither Colonel Taylor nor anyone else had been brought
forward to testify to Adams's motive in voting against the
sequestration act, and, according to Chase, this was a fundamental
flaw in the attempt to prove the truth of Callender's statement. Only
with some proof of improper motive could the defense of truth be
attained. Without evidence on motive, it made no sense to admit
Colonel Taylor's testimony because it would not form an adequate
defense of the truth of the statement. It would even be prejudicial to
admit Colonel Taylor's testimony because the jury might be misled
into believing that evidence of truth had been offered when a crucial
element (motive) was missing. According to the rules of evidence,
which forbid the admission of prejudicial or irrelevant evidence, Chase
believed he had no choice but to bar Colonel Taylor's testimony.
54
The matter of Colonel Taylor's testimony was an exceptionally
technical one, but there was another aspect-a bit easier to
53. See PRESSER & ZAINALDIN, supra note 9, at 238-41 (reproducing Chase's comments at
the trial of Callender); id. at 264-65 (reproducing Chase's comments at his impeachment trial).
54. Chase rejected Col. Taylor's testimony because it failed to prove the entirety of the
charge that Adams was a professed aristocrat who proved serviceable to the British interest.
Despite the suggestions by Hoffer and Hull to the contrary, this was not because "as far as
[Chase] could determine, the testimony would go to only one of the counts against Callender."
HOFFER & HULL, supra note 2, at 230.
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understand-of Chase's alleged misconduct at the Callender trial that
became an important element of the impeachment charges brought
against him. This was the brouhaha surrounding the famous "Virginia
Syllogism" offered by Wirt, Hay, and Nicholas at the trial.55 The three
attorneys offered no substantive defense to nineteen of the twenty
charges brought against Callender. This meant, of course, that
Callender could have been convicted on any of the other charges,
which certainly would have been sufficient to imprison him. Still,
what Wirt, Hay, and Nicholas actually seemed to have wanted, for
political purposes or even for the ultimate defense of their client, was
to convince the jury to reject a guilty verdict on the grounds that the
federal sedition law was unconstitutional.
It was the Jeffersonian position at this time that the First
Amendment included a prohibition on any federal seditious libel
statute at all, because such a statute arguably restrained speech. 5
6
This was a relatively dubious proposition; in England at least, freedom
of speech had never been conceived as giving one the right to libel
others with accusations of criminal conduct.57 The Jeffersonians also
believed that there was no such thing as a federal common law of
crimes. 58 Thus, seditious libel, as a common law crime, could only be
the subject of a federal statute if the Constitution granted the power
to legislate regarding crimes at common iaw. Given the Jeffersonian
belief that the powers of the federal government should be narrowly
construed and limited to those enumerated in the Constitution, one
ought not to imply this broad common law of crimes power. Therefore,
a fortiori, given the First Amendment, which prohibited any
55. See PRESSER, ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 1, at 136-40 (discussing the
' Virginia Syllogism" and its significance).
56. See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (rev. ed. 1985)
[hereinafter LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS] (discussing the history of seditious libel
doctrine in the United States, and, in particular, the emergence of Jefferson's and Madison's
opposition to seditious libel, particularly at the federal level); LEONARD W. LEVY, JEFFERSON AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER SIDE (1963) (discussing the convoluted views of Jefferson
regarding civil liberties).
57. See generally LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS, supra note 56.
58. According to Jefferson, in a 1799 letter he wrote to Edmund Randolph:
all that the Federalist "monocrats," "aristocrats," and "monarchists" had done
to harass the people-the creation of the bank of the United States, Jay's
Treaty, the imposition of a standing army and navy, and the passage of the
Sedition Act-were "solitary, inconsequential timid things in comparison with
the audacious, barefaced and sweeping pretension to a system of law for the
U.S. without the adoption of their legislature, and so infinitely beyond their
power to adopt."
9 WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 73 (P. Ford ed., 1904), quoted in PRESSER, ORIGINAL
MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 1, at 67-68.
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congressional restrictions on the freedom of speech, a federal law
regarding seditious libel was impermissible. This was the argument
that Wirt, Hay, and Nicholas wished to make to Callender's jury. They
hoped to convince the jury that the federal seditious libel statute
exceeded congressional powers, thus it ought to be regarded as
unconstitutional, and, accordingly, Callender should be found not
guilty.
59
It was a bold argument, and Chase would have none of it.
When it became clear that Callender's counsel wished to argue the
constitutionality of the seditious libel statute, Chase demanded that
they prove that the jury could judge constitutionality.60 This led to the
statement of the "Virginia Syllogism," which ran roughly as follows:
1. In Virginia the jury is the judge of law and fact.
2. The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law.
3. Therefore, in Virginia, the jury is the judge of the constitutionality of a statute.
6 1
Upon hearing the syllogism, Chase advised Callender's counsel
that it was "[a] non sequitur, sir,"62 and he refused to allow them to
argue the unconstitutionality of the statute to the jury. Chase
explained that because Article III vested the judicial power in the
courts, and because the question of constitutionality was undeniably
part of the judicial power, it was for the court rather than the jury to
address constitutional questions.6 3 This anchoring of the power of
judicial review in the judiciary tracked the arguments of Federalist
78. Significantly, John Marshall was in the audience for the Callender
trial6 4 and later used similar language in his defense of judicial review
in Marbury v. Madison.
6 5
After one of Callender's lawyers failed to convince Chase of the
validity of the Virginia Syllogism, the two others rose seriatim to try
again. Chase rebuffed them as well, having earlier disparaged the
three as "young gentlemen"66 who appeared not to understand the
proper functions of judge and jury. Chase's "rude and contemptuous"
59. For an excerpted report of Callender's counsel's arguments on this point, see PRESSER &
ZAINALDIN, supra note 9, at 241-43.
60. Id. at 241.
61. See id. at 241-43 for statements of the Virginia Syllogism by Wirt, Hay, and Nicholas.
62. Id. at 241.
63. Id. at 243-47.
64. PRESSER, ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 1, at 242 n.42 (citing 3 ALBERT
BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 39, 40 n. 1 (1919)).
65. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (laying down the foundation of judicial review and
stating "[iut is emphatically the province of the judicial department to say what the law is").
66. PRESSER & ZAINALDIN, supra note 9, at 240.
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expressions to Callender's counsel were later made part of the
impeachment charges brought against him, 67 but it is easy to
understand how the irritable Chase could believe he was being toyed
with by the Virginians. William Wirt's biographer wrote that Wirt,
Hay, and Nicholas "deliberately baited the easily irascible Chase;
anticipated his explosive response; and planned from the outset to
walk out of the courtroom and leave Callender to his fate. 68
Still, the logic of the Virginia Syllogism seems indisputable, if
the jury was really to be both the judge of law and fact. And, indeed,
there is no denying that the Virginia practice at the time gave the jury
wide discretion, even if that meant that the jury would essentially
make up the law as it went along. This was the position that
Randolph, who led the eventual impeachment proceedings against
Chase in the House, maintained at Chase's Senate trial.6 9 Yet for
Chase, either because of his experience in England70 or his experience
as a lawyer and judge in Maryland (where the jury was kept on a
tighter leash), the role of the jury was supposed to be much
narrower. 71 For some Americans, including many Virginians, the jury
needed wide discretion to safeguard against an abusive government.
As in the Zenger trial and the Seven Bishops trial before it, it was
necessary for the jury to have the power to nullify a statute thought
excessively arbitrary or inappropriate. For Chase, though, the jury's
possession of this power allowed it to nullify the rule of- law itself,
something that to him seemed wrong.
72
The truism that the jury was to be the judge of law and fact,
then, meant something different to Chase than what it meant to the
Virginians. Perhaps the best way to explain the truism and reconcile
it with Chase's belief that it was the jury's task to take the law from
the judge is to suggest that for Chase, the jury was to render what we
might describe as "the law of the case": the manner in which the jury
67. Id. at 258.
68. PRESSER, ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 1, at 134 (quoting 1 JOHN P.
KENNEDY, MEMOIRS OF THE LIFE OF WILLIAM WIRT 81-84 (1849)).
69. For Randolph's suggestions that the jury in a criminal case must be free to decide for
itself what the law was, and should be free to ignore precedent, see the edited version of his
argument at the trial of Chase, reproduced in PRESSER & ZAINALDIN, supra note 9, at 270-72.
70. Chase spent almost a year in England from September 1783 to August 1784. See
generally PRESSER, ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 1, at 46-47.
71. For the manner in which Chase's views-influenced by English and Maryland
practice-differed from those of the lawyers in Pennsylvania who defended Fries, see id. at 111-
12. For the narrow nature of the role of the jury in English law, see, e.g., id. at 137-38.
72. For Chase's comments at his impeachment trial that the jury did not possess a
"dispensing power" over the law and that it was their duty to take the law from the court, see
PRESSER & ZAINALDIN, supra note 9, at 261.
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applies the law as given by the judge to the facts of the particular
case. For Chase, this was all that was meant by the phrase the jury
was to be the judge "of law and fact." The jury had no right to reject
the law pronounced by the judge, and thus had no right to declare that
the law enunciated by the judge amounted to an unconstitutional
mandate. Such activity would have been an impermissible usurpation
of the judicial role.
73
IV. THE BALTIMORE GRAND JURY CHARGE
Chase's fear that the Jeffersonians were trifling with the rule
of law was also evident in his infamous charge given to a Baltimore
Grand Jury in 1803, the act that seems to have put in motion his
impeachment proceedings.7 4 With Jefferson's victory in 1800, Chase
feared for the rule of law in general and the independence of the
judiciary in particular. Three developments most concerned' him: (1)
the 1802 Judiciary Act, in which the Jeffersonians abolished the
federal circuit courts created in the last days of the Adams
Administration; (2) the abolition of two courts in Maryland-also an
effort to consolidate Jeffersonian power over the judiciary, this time at
the state level; and (3) the institution of universal male suffrage in
Maryland.7 5
To take the last development first, Chase believed that
universal suffrage was dangerous because it would result in the
franchise being exercised by men who did not have "property in, a
73. For further thought on Chase's narrow conception of the role of the jury, prompted by
his desire to preserve the rule of law, see generally PRESSER, ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING,
supra note 1, at 136-38. Demonstrating his belief that only judges were competent to pass on the
constitutionality of a statute, Chase wrote:
The Judicial power of the United States is coexistent, co-extensive, and
coordinate with and altogether independent of the Legislature, & the
Executive, and the Judges of the Supreme and District courts are bound by
their Oath of Office to regulate their Decisions agreeably to the Constitution.
The Judicial power, therefore, are the only proper and competent authority to
decide whether any Law made by Congress or any of the State Legislatures is
contrary to or in Violation of the Federal Constitution.
Chase, supra note 3, at 12. Similar language appears id. at 28-29.
74. For an edited version of the Baltimore grand jury charge, see PRESSER & ZAINALDIN,
supra note 9, at 252-54. For the original manuscript of the Baltimore grand jury charge, see
Chase, supra note 3, at 38-44. For the assertion that the Baltimore grand jury charge triggered
Chase's impeachment, see, e.g., ELLIS, supra note 8, at 79-82. As was the practice at the time,
Chase was not seeking to get the grand jury to return any particular indictment but was
generally instructing them on their responsibilities.
75. For a discussion of what prompted the Baltimore grand jury charge, and the philosophy
there expressed, see PRESSER, ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 1, at 143-46.
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common interest with, and an attachment to, the community."76 The
risk of allowing such men to vote was that their votes could be bought
by demagogues or those who wished to corrupt the government to
serve selfish financial ends. To allow universal suffrage, Chase told
his grand jurors, "will, in my opinion, certainly and rapidly destroy all
protection to property, and all security to personal liberty; and our
republican constitution will sink into a mobocracy, the worst of all
possible governments. '" 77 The "abolition of the office of the sixteen
circuit judges," coupled with universal suffrage, Chase warned, "will,
in my judgment, take away all security for property and personal
liberty," because the "independence of the national judiciary is already
shaken to its foundation, and the virtue of the people alone can restore
it." 78
While Chase didn't explain exactly how it happened, he told
the Baltimore grand jurors that these Jeffersonian reforms had come
about because of
visionary and theoretical writers [Paine and Jefferson, influenced perhaps by Locke],
asserting that men in a state of society are entitled to exercise rights which they
possessed in a state of nature; and the modern doctrines by our late reformers, that all
men in a state of society, are entitled to enjoy equal liberty and equal rights .... 79
For Chase, who was presumably influenced by Hobbes:
[Tlhere could be no rights of man in a state of nature, previous to the institution of
society... the great object for which men establish any form of government is to obtain
security to their persons and property from violence; destroy the security to either and
you tear up society by the roots.
8 0
Chase told the grand jury that he "cheerfully subscribed" to the
"doctrine of equal liberty and equal rights," but for him this meant
only that "every citizen, without respect to property or station, should
enjoy an equal share of civil liberty; an equal protection from the laws,
and an equal security for his person and property."8 1 It seemed to
Chase that the Jeffersonians had put equal protection from the laws
and equal security for person and property in danger. Chase asked:
"Will justice be impartially administered by judges dependent on the
legislature for their continuance in office, and also for their support?"8 2
He ended his charge with the query: "Will liberty or property be
protected or secured, by laws made by representatives chosen by
76. PRESSER & ZAINALDIN, supra note 9, at 252, 254.








electors, who have no property in, a common interest with, or
attachment to the community?"8
3
The blatant criticism of the Jeffersonians in Congress and in
Maryland was enough to trigger impeachment proceedings that had
long been contemplated against Chase, from the time that he moved
against the first Jeffersonian scribbler. Furthermore, getting rid of
Chase would open the door to replacing him with a more pliant
Jeffersonian jurist from Maryland already picked out by the
Jeffersonians. 4 President Jefferson gave the go-ahead, although
seeking a more-or-less Nixonian plausible denial by trying to keep his
involvement in the effort to remove Chase unknown.8 5
In the meantime, Chase sought John Marshall's assistance in
declaring the 1802 Judiciary Act unconstitutional, since it removed
judges by a means other than the constitutionally specified
impeachment procedure.8 6 This strikes me as a plausible argument,
and although Marshall may have been initially inclined to oppose
what both he and Chase perceived as the unconstitutional actions of
the Jeffersonian-controlled legislature, eventually Marshall backed
off, probably seeking to avoid an out-and-out clash with the Jefferson
Administration that he might lose. Avoiding such a clash seems to
have been what Marshall did in Marbury v. Madison, 7 in which he
ruled that the judiciary had no power to compel Jefferson's Secretary
of State to grant commissions, even though the withholding was
clearly contrary to law. In the end, the Marshall Court eventually
upheld the 1802 Judiciary Act in Stuart v. Laird.8
83. Id.
84. See ELLIS, supra note 8, at 80 (suggesting that Chase's successor would have been
Joseph Hooper Nicholson, a Republican Congressman from Maryland).
85. See id. ("[T]here can be no doubt that the President was giving his consent to having
Chase removed. It appears that Jefferson expected the impeachment of Chase to be hazardous
politically, for he added, significantly, 'for myself, it is better that I should not interfere.' ").
86. Chase's plea to Marshall is contained in Letter from Samuel Chase to John Marshall
(Apr. 24, 1802), in GEORGE L. HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN
MARSHALL 1801-1815, at 172, 172-77 n.182 (1981). A copy of the letter is available at the New
York Historical Society, and the letter can also be found in 6 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL
109, 109-16 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1990). The 1802 Judiciary Act abolished the circuit
courts (which had been staffed by Federalist judges) created by the Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, 2
Stat. 89 which was passed in the waning days of the Adams administration and, as indicated
earlier, called thereafter the 'Midnight Judges" Act.
87. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
88. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803). For a perceptive review of the response of Marshall and
the other Justices to the Jeffersonians' conduct, and a careful comparison of Marbury and Stuart,
see ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 163-98.
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V. PRINCIPLES OF CHASE'S JURISPRUDENCE AND HIS QUALITIES AS A
JUDGE
Chase, unlike Marshall, was never one to avoid a fight.
Perhaps this was because Marshall was a more adept judicial
politician who chose only the battles he knew he could win. Still,
Chase seemingly never waivered in his principles, while Marshall, at
the time of Chase's impeachment, openly acknowledged that review of
the constitutionality of statutes should not be exercised by the
judiciary, but by Congress alone,8 9 an episode rarely acknowledged by
those who ritually praise Marshall as the father of American judicial
review.
While the Jeffersonians sought to remove Chase, it is
intriguing to note that some aspects of Chase's jurisprudence tracked
those of at least some Jeffersonians. In 1798, in United States v.
Worrall,90 Chase made clear his belief that there was no federal
common law of crimes, and that the federal government could not
indict and prosecute miscreants without a federal statute defining the
crime and affixing a punishment. His opinion created quite a stir with
his fellow Federalist judges, who may have better understood the
likelihood of measures being soon taken to bring Jeffersonian editors
and publishers to trial on seditious libel charges based on the common
law.91
In Worrall, the defendant had unsuccessfully sought to bribe
the federal Commissioner of Revenue, and the jury convicted the
defendant. Immediately thereafter, the defendant's counsel moved to
have the verdict set aside on the grounds that no statute made the
attempt to bribe the Commissioner of Revenue a crime, even though
other federal statutes prohibited bribery of other federal officials.
Judge Peters, sitting with Chase, had no problem with the indictment
in Worrall, as he believed that every government, state or federal,
could punish such crimes as a matter of self-defense. 92 Chase differed
with his colleague, explaining that there was no statute that adopted
the common law at the federal level, and because the common law of
89. The story is told by Marshall's great biographer, Albert Beveridge, in 3 THE LIFE OF
JOHN MARSHALL 176-79 (1919).
90. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 384 (1798), reprinted in PRESSER & ZAINALDIN, supra note 9, at 214-20.
91. For a discussion of the controversy over the federal common law (the existence of which
was affirmed by all of the Federalist judges, save Chase), see generally PRESSER, ORIGINAL
MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 1, at 67-99.
92. PRESSER & ZAINALDIN, supra note 9, at 220.
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the states differed, there was no sure body of jurisprudence from
which to draw a federal common law of crimes. 93
When it became clear that Peters and Chase disagreed on the
matter, the judges suggested that the defense appeal the question of
the legitimacy of a federal common law of crimes to the Supreme
Court for resolution. By this time, however, all of the members of the
Supreme Court, save Chase, had indicated acquiescence in the idea of
federal common law crimes. Presumably understanding this, Worrall's
counsel declined to appeal and insisted that Peters and Chase come to
some agreement.9 4 Peters and Chase then retired. Wharton, the editor
of the early federal cases, speculated that they consulted the other
Supreme Court Justices, who made clear their belief that an
indictment at common law in the federal courts was perfectly
permissible.95 Chase then acquiesced in Peters's view, and Worrall
was sentenced. 96 If Chase performed a volte-face on the issue of
common law crimes, it suggests some malleability in his
jurisprudence, if not a rather stark submission to political expediency.
At least one distinguished scholar, the late Kathryn Preyer, believed
that Chase still maintained that there was no federal common law of
crimes.97 His behavior in the Worrall case, however, suggests
otherwise. Legal historian Morton Horwitz argues that Worrall
represents a difference of opinion between Peters and Chase over the
nature of law itself, with Chase believing that even the common law
represented positive acts of a sovereign state, while Peters believed
that the common law partook of the law of nature and had an eternal
quality.98 There might be something to Horwitz's argument, although
in what was arguably Chase's most famous (or most notorious)
decision, Calder v. Bull,9 9 Chase revealed himself a believer in what I
93. Id. at 218-20.
94. Id. at 220.
95. FRANCIS WHARTON, Trial of Robert Worrall, in STATE TRIALS OF THE UNITED STATES
DURING THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF WASHINGTON AND ADAMS 190, 199 n.* (1849).
96. PRESSER & ZAINALDIN, supra note 9, at 220.
97. Kathryn Preyer, Jurisdiction to Punish: Federal Authority, Federalism and the Common
Law of Crimes in the Early Republic, 4 LAW & HIST. REV. 223, 234-36 (1986).
98. For information on Justice Chase and Worrall, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 11-12 (1977). For information on the belief
of an "instrumental conception of law" held by early judges, see id. at 16-30.
99. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
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have called "supra-constitutional principles,"'100 drawn from something
that looks a whole lot like natural law itself. 01
To be fair to Chase, he may not have understood that in his
Calder opinion he was necessarily trafficking in natural law; rather,
he was exploring the basic meaning of the rule of law. According to
Chase (in words extraordinarily similar to those employed
contemporaneously by the great Jeffersonian Virginia judge Spence
Roane), there are certain great principles that circumscribe what any
legislature can do. These include maxims such as no man can be judge
and party in his own case, no act legal when performed can later be
prosecuted as a criminal violation, and no legislature can simply take
the property of A and give it to B. 10 2 Roane called such restrictions on
legislatures "those great rights and principles, for the preservation of
which all just governments are founded."10 3 Chase described them in
Calder as flowing "from the very nature of our free Republican
governments."104
Chase's belief reflects a deep reverence for the protection of
individual rights and private property, also reflected in his 1803
Grand Jury Charge. But it is also true that his notion of binding
"supra-constitutional principles" was difficult to cabin and opened a
wide swath for determining legislative acts unconstitutional without
the benefit of express constitutional provisions. Accordingly, strict
constructionists such as Robert Bork have condemned Chase's Calder
opinion as the first "substantive due process" decision, leading
eventually to such regrettable judicial behavior as that manifested in
Dred Scott and Roe v. Wade.'0 5
For Chase, an understanding of history was probably the guide
to the principles that limited all legislatures, and thus for him his
"supra-constitutional principles" were not a license for judicial
discretion in the same manner as was a historically indeterminate
federal common law of crimes. Thus, Iredell, who dissented from
Chase's view in Calder on the grounds that Chase was advocating an
100. See Stephen B. Presser, The Supra-Constitution, the Courts, and the Federal Common
Law of Crimes: Some Comments on Palmer and Preyer, 4 LAW & HIST. REV. 325, 327 (1986)
(arguing that early federal judges employed supra-constitutional theory in deciding cases).
101. On the natural law aspects of Chase's opinion in Calder v. Bull, see Stephen B. Presser,
Should a Supreme Court Justice Apply Natural Law?: Lessons from Earlier Federal Judges, 5
BENCHMARK 103, 104-06 (1993) [hereinafter Presser, Natural Law].
102. Calder, 3 U.S. at 387-89.
103. Currie's Adm'rs v. Mut. Assurance Soc'y, 14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 315, 349 (1809), reprinted
in PRESSER & ZAINALDIN, supra note 9, at 360-64.
104. 3 U.S. at 388.
105. For Bork's criticism of Calder v. Bull and substantive due process, see ROBERT H. BORK,
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 19-20, 31-32 (1990).
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unrestrained and uncertain view of natural law, probably missed the
mark. 106 For the most part, Chase had a limited conception of the
judicial role. Still, he was certainly capable of sweeping statements.
For example, in Ware v. Hylton,10 7 he declared (delivering a loss to
John Marshall in the only case Marshall argued before the Supreme
Court) that a Virginia law could not trump a federal treaty because
Article VI's Supremacy Clause operated retrospectively to "prostrate"
all state laws in conflict with lawful acts of the federal government.
Chase had originally opposed the Federal Constitution because
he believed it too tightly constricted the sovereignty of the states.
108
His opposition to the federal common law of crimes, which he shared
with the Jeffersonians, may have flowed from that early view. When it
came to fundamental matters of national sovereignty, however, such
as a treaty or enforcing the Alien and Sedition Acts, Chase was a
reliable supporter of the Adams Administration. Indeed, in a letter
seeking appointment to the federal bench, Chase promised President
Washington that, if nominated, he would "exert [himself] to execute so
honourable and important a station with integrity, fidelity, and
diligence," and that the father of his country would "never have the
occasion to regret the confidences bestowed in me." 109 This fierce
loyalty to the Federalist administrations might even explain why
Chase was willing to reverse himself on the issue of common law
crimes in Worrall, to align himself with his Federalist judicial
brethren and his broad construction of federal prerogatives in Ware v.
Hylton.
CONCLUSION
Although Marshall still tends to receive most of the credit for
judicial review, we are increasingly appreciating that several of
Marshall's predecessors assumed the existence of the doctrine.
Hamilton wrote about it in Federalist 78, and Chase was willing to go
further in its invocation (to nullify the 1802 Judiciary Act, for
106. On Iredell's dissent from Chase's views in Calder v. Bull, see Presser, Natural Law,
supra note 100, at 106-08.
107. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 237 (1796).
108. For Chase's early opposition to the proposed Federal Constitution, see, e.g., PRESSER,
ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 1, at 22-24.
109. Letter from Samuel Chase to George Washington (Sept. 3, 1789) (on file with the
Historical Society of Pennsylvania); see also Letter from Samuel Chase to Tench Coxe (Apr. 2,
1793) (on file with the Historical Society of Pennsylvania) (indicating Chase's desire to "quit the
state service and to be employed by the General Government," where he promised to render the
government "every support, that office and duty may require").
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example) than Marshall himself proved willing to go. 110 Perhaps
Marshall, a subtler politician than Chase, and a Chief Justice who
molded his Court into a body which effectively championed the
hegemony of the federal government over the states, deserves his fame
as the greatest of the Justices.'11 At the very least, however, Chase
deserves a place higher than his usual designation as an "American
Jeffreys."
There is no doubt that Chase was a partisan, but in his era,
after all, the idea of a legitimate political opposition was not generally
accepted, and he believed his partisanship necessary to preserve the
republic and the rule of law from Jeffersonian folly and mendacity.
The Jeffersonians won, of course, becoming the victors with the spoils
of writing history. Over time, however, Chase's vieivs on the
requirements of the rule of law, the allocation of power between judge
and jury, judicial review, and the supremacy of the federal
government became accepted wisdom and part of what Ted White
called the "American Judicial Tradition."'112 If Chase's personal
shortcomings (his political partisanship and quick temper) ought to
deprive him of a place in the pantheon of truly great American
Justices, perhaps he still deserves to be classified as an astute,
learned, principled, and wise one.
110. Joseph Story agreed with Chase that the 1802 Judiciary Act was unconstitutional since
it deprived judges of their position without impeachment. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 495 n.2 (1833), reprinted in ACKERMAN, supra note 6,
at 180.
111. There is, however, some revisionist opinion on Marshall's greatness. See, e.g., Michael J.
Klarman, How Great Were the "Great" Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 VA. L. REV. 1111 (2001)
(arguing that the Marshall Court decisions were not as significant as commonly believed);
Stephen B. Presser, Some Alarming Aspects of the Legacies of Judicial Review and of John
Marshall, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1495 (2002) (arguing that Marshall deserves less historical
attention and other early Supreme Court Justices, such as Chase and Story, deserve more).
112. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING
AMERICAN JUDGES (3d ed. 2007).
370 [Vol. 62:2:349
